# 1AC

## same

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## at: circumvent

#### Clear statement requirement solves- no circumvention

Landau 9 (Joseph, Associate-in-Law, Columbia Law School. MUSCULAR PROCEDURE: CONDITIONAL DEFERENCE IN THE EXECUTIVE DETENTION CASES Washington Law Review Vol. 84:661, 2009)

The executive detention cases of the past several years have prompted renewed debate over the proper scope of judicial deference to the executive branch’s claimed need to limit individual liberties during times of crisis. Some theorists argue that courts should resolve large policy questions raised by individual challenges to assertions of executive power.1 Others believe that courts should decide as little as possible, asking only whether executive action is grounded within statutory authority.2 However, a number of the post-9/11 national security decisions have accomplished a great deal without following either approach. In these cases, the Supreme Court and a number of lower courts have put procedural devices to surprisingly “muscular” uses. The decisions illustrate a rare but critical assertion of procedural law where the political branches fail to legislate or properly implement substantive law. This is “muscular procedure”—the invocation of a procedural rule to condition deference on coordinate branch integrity. The cases provide a framework for understanding the role of judicial review in the post-9/11 executive detention decisions, with implications for other fields of law as well.3 Many commentators have criticized the Supreme Court’s executive detention decisions as “merely” procedural rulings, pointing out that the Court has generally addressed itself to questions about adjective law or the ground rules of litigation: whether the Court has jurisdiction; whether detainees can access the courts; and whether the government is required to provide discovery, and if so, how much.4 Far fewer decisions have resolved substantive questions such as the scope of executive power and the content of individual liberty—that is, whom the Executive can hold and for how long, and the specific constitutional protections that apply. But regardless of whether a particular decision turns on “process” or “substance”—an age-old distinction that resists clear definition5—courts have affected the law of national security in profound ways by explicitly requiring the political branches to adhere to a judicially imposed standard of transparency and deliberation. In individual cases, rulings about seemingly mundane procedural issues such as discovery and evidentiary standards have accelerated the release of enemy combatant detainees who were held at Guantánamo Bay years after being cleared of any wrongdoing.6 More broadly, procedural devices have been used to smoke out and put in check Congress’s lack of oversight of the executive branch and its misguided interpretations and implementation of authorizing legislation.7 In a number of these cases, courts have resolved the merits of an enemy combatant8 challenge by scrutinizing the Executive’s adherence \ to baseline procedural safeguards—rejecting determinations based on absolute secrecy, innuendo, tentativeness, or multiple levels of hearsay, while affirming executive branch decisions satisfying minimal standards of reliability.9 In the process, the judiciary has rebuffed the President’s extreme interpretations of vague authorizing legislation,10 reexamined inadequately reasoned decisions by various arms of the executive branch in implementing a congressional delegation,11 and stimulated legislative action where Congress has failed to oversee executive decision-making through the legislative process.12 Throughout these decisions, procedure functions as a corrective to decision-making by one (or both) of the political branches that, if left undisturbed, would violate a judicially imposed standard requiring lucid, intelligible procedures.

#### No risk of circumvention –

Green 11 (Craig, Prof of Law at Temple Unviersity , Northwestern University Law Review, Vol 105, No 3"Ending the Korematsu Era: An Early View From the War on Terror Cases")

Jackson’s hard-nosed analysis may seem intellectually bracing, but it understates the real-world power of judicial precedent to shape what is po- litically possible.306 Although presidential speeches occasionally declare a willingness to disobey Supreme Court rulings, actual disobedience of this sort is rare and would carry grave political consequences.307 Even President Bush’s losses in the GWOT cases did not spur serious consideration of noncompliance despite broad support from a Republican Congress.308 Likewise, from the perspective of strengthening presidential power, Kore- matsu-era decisions emboldened President Bush in his twenty-first-century choices about Guantánamo and military commissions.309 Thus, the modern historical record shows that judicial precedent can both expand and restrict the political sphere of presidential action.¶ The operative influence of judicial precedent is even stronger than a court-focused record might suggest, as the past sixty years have witnessed a massive bureaucratization and legalization of all levels of executive gov- ernment.310 From the White House Counsel, to the Pentagon, to other enti- ties addressing intelligence and national security issues, lawyers now occupy such high-level governmental posts that almost no significant policy is determined without multiple layers of legal review.311 And these execu- tive lawyers are predominantly trained to think—whatever else they may believe—that Supreme Court precedent is authoritative and binding.312

## K

#### No root cause of violence

Muro-Ruiz 2 (Diego, London School of Economics, “The Logic of Violence”, Politics, 22(2), p. 116)

Violence is, most of the time, a wilful choice, especially if it is made by an organisation. Individuals present the scholar with a more difficult case to argue for. Scholars of violence have now a wide variety of perspectives they can use – from sociology and political science, to psychology, psychiatry and even biology – and should escape easy judgements. However, the fundamental difficulty for all of us is the absence of a synthetic, general theory able of integrating less complete theories of violent behaviour. In the absence of such a general theory, researchers should bear in mind that violence is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that resists mono-causal explanations. Future research on violence will have to take in account the variety of approaches, since they each offer some understanding of the logic of violence.

Deconstructing law fails to regulate detention

Jenks and Talbot-Jensen 11 (INDEFINITE DETENTION UNDER THE LAWS OF WAR Chris Jenks\* & Eric Talbot Jensen\*\* Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps. Presently serving as the Chief of the International Law Branch, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Washington D.C. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and not The Judge Advocate General's Corps, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense. \*\* Visiting Assistant Professor, Fordham Law School. The authors wish to thank Sue Ann Johnson for her exceptional research and editing skills, and the organizers and attendees at both the 3rd Annual National Security Law Jtinior Faculty Workshop at the University of Texas School of Law, where we first discussed the ideas for this article, and the Stanford Law and Policy Review National Defense Symposium, where we first presented the finished product. STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 22:1] Page Lexis)

Those who would deconstruct the law of war as applied to detention stemming from armed conflict with non state actors may achieve victory, but in an academic, and, practically speaking, pyrrhic sense. Arguing that the Geneva Conventions for Prisoners and Civilians do not, on their face, apply to members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban may be correct, and in more than one way. But in so arguing, the deconstructionist approach removes a large portion of intemationally recognized and accepted provisions for regulating detention associated with armed conflict—^the Geneva Conventions—^while leaving the underlying question of how to govern detention unanswered. At some point, even the deconstmctionist must shift to positivism and propose an altemative, an altemative we submit would inevitably resemble that which is already extant in the law of war. Moreover, while there has been discussion about the strained application of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols to states combating transnational terrorism, attempts at a new convention have gained little traction. Our approach is more an attempt at pragmatism than radicalism—there are individuals currently detained, purportedly indefinitely and under the law of war. Yet despite years of such detention, two administrations have provided little if any information on what exactly such detention means, how and by what it is govemed, and if and how it ends. Conflating aspects of intemationally recognized law of war conventions allows for a transparent process that could be promulgated now. Whether for the up to fifty or so individuals currently detained at Guantanamo or for those who may be detained in the future, we posit that the law of war provides a legitimate model for indefinite detention. And, as the Walsh Report recognized,^' the longer detainees are held, the more concern for their individual situations must be given. We therefore analyze the complete protections provided by the law of war and advocate that all of them, over time and to varying degrees, be applied to the detainees in Guantanamo. In this way, detention under the laws of war can provide a humane system of indefinite detention that strikes the right balance between the security of the nation and the rights of individuals

#### Pragmatic reasoning is correct- prior questions cause policy failure

Kratochwil, IR Prof @ Columbia, 8 [Friedrich Kratochwil is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Columbia University, Pragmatism in International Relations “Ten points to ponder about pragmatism” p11-25]

Firstly, a pragmatic approach does not begin with objects or “things” (ontology), or with reason and method (epistemology), but with “acting” ( *prattein*), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, as historical beings placed in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to act and must do so always under time pressures and in the face of incomplete information. Precisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear *ex ante*, because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions, and the multiple possibilities are rife with incentives for (dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts informing actors about the relevant features of the situation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties.

 Instead of relying on certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to detail, rather than to generality, matter

#### Judicial action is a meaningful restraint, and debating judicial prez powers restraints is good

Serrano and Minami, ‘03 (Susan, Project Director, Equal Justice Society; J.D. 1998, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai', partner, Minami, Lew & Timaki, Asian Law Journal, Korematsu v. United States: A "Constant Caution" in a Time of Crisis, p. Lexis)

Today, a broadly conceived political identity is critical to the defense of civil liberties. In 1942, Japanese Americans stood virtually alone, without allies, and suffered the banishment of their entire race. Forty years later, Japanese Americans, supported by Americans of all colors, were able to extract an apology and redress from a powerful nation. That lesson of the need for political empowerment was made even more obvious after September 11, 2001, when Arab and Muslim American communities, politically isolated and besieged by hostility fueled by ignorance, became targets of violence and discrimination. In the aftermath of September 11, Japanese Americans knew from history that the United States, which turned on them in 1942, could repeat itself in 2001. Therefore, on September 12, 2001, the Japanese American Citizens' League, the oldest Asian American civil rights organization in the country, immediately issued a press release warning against racial discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans and supporting their  [**[\*49]**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=bee887063044547ab12532f483726d11&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAk&_md5=f0e31afba24c7755402ea0ead0b3cfb6&focBudTerms=%2522serrano%2522%20and%20%2522minami%2522%20and%20%2522korematsu%2522&focBudSel=all)  civil rights.n60 Other Japanese American individuals and groups have offered their friendship, political support, and solidarity with Arab and Muslim Americans. Japanese Americans also knew from their Redress experience that political power was the strongest antidote. The coram nobis legal teams understood the political dimensions of their cases and adopted a course of litigation that would discredit the Wartime Cases by undermining the legal argument that the Supreme Court had legitimized the World War II exclusion and detention. This impaired (though did not overturn) the value of Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui as legal precedents for mass imprisonments of any definable racial group without due process. The even larger vision of these cases, however, was the long-term education of the American public. Many still believed (and continue to believe) that there were valid reasons for incarcerating Japanese Americans en masse: the coram nobis cases strongly refuted that notion and boldly illuminated the essentially political nature of the judicial system. In doing so, the coram nobis cases have contributed to the public's education about the frailty of civil rights and the evanescence of justice in our courts. As such, these cases highlight the need for continuing political activism and constant vigilance to protect our civil rights. In today's climate of fear and uncertainty, we must engage ourselves to assure that the vast national security regime does not overwhelm the civil liberties of vulnerable groups. This means exercising our political power, making our dissents heard, publicizing injustices done to our communities as well as to others, and enlisting allies from diverse communities. Concretely, this may mean joining others' struggles in the courts, Congress, schools and union halls; organizing protests against secret arrests, incarcerations, and deportations; building coalitions with other racial communities; writing op-ed essays or letters to politicians; launching media campaigns; donating money; and writing essays and articles.n61 Through these various ways, "our task is to compel our institutions, particularly the courts, to be vigilant, to "protect all.'" n62 The lesson of the Wartime Cases and coram nobis cases taken together is not that the government may target an entire ethnic group in the name of national security; the cases teach us instead that civil rights and liberties are best protected by strongly affirming their place in our national character, especially in times of national crisis. As Fred Korematsu avowed nearly twenty years ago, we must not let our governmental  **[[\*50]](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=bee887063044547ab12532f483726d11&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAk&_md5=f0e31afba24c7755402ea0ead0b3cfb6&focBudTerms=%2522serrano%2522%20and%20%2522minami%2522%20and%20%2522korematsu%2522&focBudSel=all)**  institutions mistreat another racial group in such a manner again. To do this, we must "collectively [turn] the lessons learned, the political and economic capital gained, the alliances forged and the spirit renewed, into many small and some grand advances against continuing harmful discrimination across America."n63 We must become, as Professor Yamamoto has argued, "present-day social actors, agents of justice, because real, hard injustices are occurring all around us every day to Asian Americans and other racial communities and beyond." n64

#### Detention DA to the alt- only opening up the courts to petitions divests Obama’s authority to detain social justice activists- the impact is forced internment

Stephen Lendman (Research Associate of the Center for Research on Globalization) July 19, 2013 “US Courts Approve Indefinite Detention and Torture” http://www.mathaba.net/news/?x=633237

Fundamental freedoms are illusory. They're vanishing. They lie in history's dustbin. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provisions let federal troops arrest and imprison US citizens and foreign nationals. They can do it at home or abroad. They can do it anywhere. They can be held indefinitely uncharged and untried. They can be tortured. They can be forced to admit crimes they didn't commit. They can be murdered on Obama's say. Police state lawlessness rules. It's the law of the land. Obama's a tinpot despot. He's judge, jury and executioner. Fundamental rights are gone. They don't apply. Anyone can be arrested, imprisoned, held indefinitely and tortured for doing the right thing. Protesting imperial lawlessness, social injustice, corporate crime, government corruption, or political Washington run of, by and for rich elites can be criminalized. So can free speech, assembly, religion, or anything challenging America's right to kill, destroy and pillage with impunity. It's official. Tyranny rules. America's unsafe to live in. There's no place to hide. Challenging diktat power's criminalized. Police state ruthlessness targets anyone trying. Military dungeons or secret FEMA concentration camps await victims.

America's no democracy. It's not beautiful. It's a battleground. It's nightmarish for countless numbers affected. Law Professor Jonathan Turley called NDAA authority ruthlessness "that would have horrified the Framers." "Indefinitely detaining citizens is something (they) were intimately familiar with and expressly sought to bar in the Bill of Rights." Other legal experts agree. Habeas, due process, and other fundamental rights are too precious to lose. They're now quaint artifacts. They're gone. They lie in history's dustbin. Tyranny replaced them. America's no different from other totalitarian states. It's ruthless. It's militarized for control. It's concentrated money power running things. It's fascism writ large. It's wrapped in the American flag. It's scapegoating challengers. It's out-of-control militarism. It's national security justification to brutalize and oppress. It's controlling the message. It's convincing people fundamental rights are abolished for their own good. It's getting most people to believe it. It's stripping off America's mask. It's showing its true face. It's menacing, cruel and unjust. Federal court decisions explain. In 2012, Hedges et al v. Obama challenged NDAA provisions. Last September, Southern District of New York federal Judge Katherine B. Forrest blocked Obama's indefinite detention law. She's the exception, not the rule. She called it "facially unconstitutional: it impermissibly impinges on guaranteed First Amendment rights and lacks sufficient definitional structure and protections to meet the requirements of due process." She added that: "If, following issuance of this permanent injunctive relief, the government detains individuals under theories of ‘substantially or directly supporting’ associated forces, as set forth in” the National Defense Authorization Act, “and a contempt action is brought before this court, the government will bear a heavy burden indeed." At issue is section 1021 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). It states in part: "Congress affirms that the authority of the president to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) includes the authority for the Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered persons (as defined in subsection (b)) pending disposition under the law of war." "Covered persons" are defined as: Anyone "who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces." Plaintiffs argued that broad, ambiguous language like "substantially supported," "associated forces" and "directly supported" leaves them and others vulnerable to lawless indefinite detention. Legally meeting someone rightly or wrongly called a terrorist, staying in their homes, inviting them to speak at conferences or in panel discussions, interviewing them, or socializing with them can be called dealing with the enemy. So can writing anti-imperial articles, exposing and/or discussing US crimes of war and against humanity, and participating in anti-war protests. Hedges et al won. Obama officials appealed. On Wednesday, the New York Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Judge Forrest's ruling. Three judges did so unanimously. They did it shamelessly. They called indefinite detention uncharged and untried OK. They said Hedges et al lacked standing. It's because federal law "says nothing at all about the president's authority to detain American citizens." False! NDAA covers everyone. US citizens are as vulnerable as foreign nationals. Appeals Court Judge Lewis Kaplan said non-citizens "failed to establish standing because they have not shown a sufficient threat that the government will detain them." Plaintiffs' lawyer Carl Mayer said "(w)e're reviewing what our options are, but I strongly suspect that we will appeal to the Supreme Court." The ruling came on the same day the District of Columbia Court of Appeals overturned a lower court ruling. At issue are oppressive Guantanamo prisoner genital area searches. District Court Judge Royce Lamberth ordered them stopped. Appeals Court judges overruled him. They authorized what's conducted to degrade, harass and humiliate. They're unrelated to security. Separately on July 16, Washington, DC District Court Judge Rosemary Collyer ruled against three Guantanamo hunger strikers. They sued to stop force-feeding. It's lawless. It's medically unethical. It's excruciatingly painful. It's torture as international law defines it. Collyer supports it. Her ruling ignored inviolable laws. She's contemptuously dismissive. She said: "There is nothing so shocking or inhumane in the treatment of petitioners - which they can avoid at will - to raise a constitutional concern that might otherwise necessitate review." "Although framed as a motion to stop feeding via nasograstric tube, Petitioners' real complaint is that the United States is not allowing them to commit suicide by starvation." According to the World Federation of Right to Die Societies: "All competent adults - regardless of their nationalities, professions, religious beliefs, and ethical and political views - who are suffering unbearably from incurable illnesses should have the possibility of various choices at the end of their life." "Death is unavoidable. We strongly believe that the manner and time of dying should be left to the decision of the individual, assuming such demands do not result in harm to society other than the sadness associated with death." Brutalizing indefinite Guantanamo detention constitutes an "incurable disease." It includes hopelessness and unbearable suffering. It prevents any chance for freedom. It denies all rights. Death's unavoidable. It'll come sooner, not later. Dying with dignity's excluded. Permitting it is fundamentally right. Not according to kangaroo federal court justice. Collyer's ruling replicated Judge Glady Kessler's July 10 decision. On the one hand, she called force-feeding "painful, humiliating and degrading." On the other, she abstained from ruling responsibly. She wrongfully claimed federal courts have no authority over Guantanamo. Obama alone has "authority to address the issue," she said. False! Kessler doesn't know the law. Maybe she does but spurned it. She ignored High Court rulings. In Rasul v. Bush (June 2004), the Supreme Court held that Guantanamo detainees may challenge their detention in civil court. In response, Congress enacted the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act. It subverted the ruling. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (June 2006), the High Court held that federal courts retain jurisdiction over habeas cases. It ruled against military commissions. It said they lack "the power to proceed because (their) structures and procedures violate both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the four Geneva Conventions." In response, Congress passed the 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA). In updated form, it's the law of the land. Supreme Court justices can challenge it. They can strike it down. They haven't done so. Perhaps a future court will. In Boumediene v. Bush (June 2008), it affirmed habeas rights for Guantanamo detainees. It let them petition for release from lawlessly imposed custody. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. He said America maintains complete jurisdiction over Guantanamo regardless of its offshore location. He opposed political branches "govern(ing) without legal restraint." He expressed concerns about usurping "power to switch the Constitution on or off at will." Doing so "lead(s) to a regime in which they, not this Court, say 'what the law is.' " "Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers are not 'absolute and unlimited' but are subject 'to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution.' " He called habeas "an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers." "The test for determining (its) scope must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain." This bedrock right has no adequate substitute. It doesn't matter. Justice in America no longer exists. Diktat power replaced it. Perhaps NDAA enactment was when freedom in America died. Post-9/11, it's been on the chopping block for elimination altogether. Tyranny's the law of the land. It's institutionalized. Fundamental rights don't matter. Democracy's a four-letter word. Out-of-control power runs things. It's unaccountable. Nonbelievers aren't tolerated. The worst is yet to come.

**Globalization is legitimate and sustainable**

**Matthews 11**

[Richard Matthews, eco-entrepreneur, eco-investor, sustainable writer, “Is Capitalism Sustainable?”, The Green Market, 5-12-2011, http://thegreenmarket.blogspot.com/2011/05/is-capitalism-sustainable.html]

Business has created the environmental crisis and now the same capitalist system that was behind the industrial revolution, is beginning to play a vital role in solving the problems it created. Despite the link between environmental practices and profitable, long-term business sustainability, many believe that capitalism itself is unsustainable. The Earth has finite resources, so their argument goes, but capitalism depends on ever expanding consumption. The truth is that dating back to the origins of our species, we have seen our use of resources evolve, from stone, to bronze and then iron. More recently we entered the information age which may prove to be the gateway to a more sustainable use of resources. Although we should do everything we can to preserve finite resources, human ingenuity is infinite. In this way we are slowly moving away from finite fossil fuels to infinitely renewable fuels such as wind, wave and solar. Market driven solutions can be incredibly powerful as they have the power to extend, promote and invest in sustainable innovation. Although new market based mechanisms like regulation, incentives and tradable permits are still a few years off, it is inevitable that the true cost of carbon will be made absolutely clear. As a tenant of the free market business should pay for the costs they incur. Sustainability will continue because it is an unstoppable mega-trend that is destined to keep growing at even faster rates. With the rise of the green consumer, businesses want to cash-in on the steady and growing demand for green goods and services. Various partnerships are emerging to help in the development of sustainable best practices. One such arrangement involves the new partnerships between corporations and environmental organizations.

**Being aware of Orientalist scholarship is sufficient—prevents one-sided views of the Middle East from informing our discourse**

**Hamid 08**

[Kbiri, Major, Royal Moroccan Air Force A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation RequirementsAdvisor: Edward Ouellette, Ph.D.Maj USAF April 2008“THE INFLUENCE OF ORIENTALISM ON AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE-EAST” http://www.scribd.com/doc/12070695/The-Influence-of-Orientalism-on-American-Perceptions-and-Policies-in-the-MiddleEast]

Of course, not all the knowledge produced by academic Orientalism is unreliable. There are certainly elements of truth in this knowledge, but one has to be at least aware of the bias and the imperfections of its approaches. Many of its methodologies are marred by epistemological flaws and inconsistencies. The shortcomings of the Orientalist framework of interpretation include foregrounding aspects and ignoring others and blaming socio-economic realities on religious or racial defects.196 While the Orientalist expertise should not be taken nor rejected wholesale, there is a need to enlist the expertise of other social science disciplines which have kept up with scientific and technological development. Many Middle-East Studies researchers have indeed adopted modern empirical tools such as surveys, statistics and case studies to provide scientifically evidenced explanations of what is going on in the Middle-East. Orientalists’ authority should not be a free pass to issue overarching statements about the Middle-East based only on their mastery of some of its language and their ability to decipher a collection of dusty medieval texts. The raging academic debate in Middle-East Studies is indicative of the existence of contending visions of the Middle-East. To feed officials or military leaders just one version of “the Middle-East” is to limit their ability to effectively come to terms with the realities they might encounter on the ground. Curricula aimed at heightening cultural awareness of this region should therefore include the works of equally authoritative if not more serious and rigorous academics198 presenting different approaches to this region. Based on OIF, decision makers should not ‘slavishly’ embrace Orientalists’ pronouncements but rather take a critical distance from their expertise. Awareness, at least, of the existence of the Orientalist prism is a key step to successfully engaging this increasingly important region in the world’s great political and economic affairs. It is time to challenge the conventional wisdom infused by Orientalism. It is time to think outside the Orientalist box.

**In-Round Criterion—the Neg has to explain precisely what our epistemology gets wrong, and why that undercuts the conclusions we have reached. Simply applying broad theories is useless criticism.**

**Lake, 2011**

[David A. Lake is the Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.., **Why "isms" are Evil: Theory, Epistemology and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress**, International Studies Quarterly 55, 465-480, weber.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeWhyIsmsareevil.pdf]

Rather than forming sects and debating theology, imagine the contributions that we as scholars could make if we devoted our professional and intellectual energies to studying things that matter. Imagine reorganizing our research and professional associations around problems, not approaches. Imagine as well a graduate ﬁeld seminar not organized around research traditions but topics like Global Climate Change, Growth and Development, Economic and Political Inequality, and Genocide and Political Violence. The seminar discussion could then focus on ‘‘what do we know’’ rather than ‘‘what are the central tenets of this particular sect’’? Likewise, the International Studies Association is divided into relatively autonomous sections, many (but not all) of which are deﬁned by research tradition. Imagine instead sections on these same sorts of substantive topics—not the Scientiﬁc Study of International Processes but a section on War, not Feminist Theory and Gender Studies but Female Political Empowerment. We might then attend panels that focus, say, on what we know about economic inequality and, more important, what we learn from new research. Professional practices are surprisingly robust things. Turning a discipline may be like turning a supertanker. As suggested, there are also individuals and organized interests vested in current professional practices, not least of which are the organizational gatekeepers who set themselves up as enforcers of purity and agenda-setters for the discipline. Institutionalized practices combined with entrenched and powerful elites militate against change. But much can be done, I hope, through the actions of individual scholars. I no longer teach the ‘‘isms’’ at the introductory level or in ﬁeld seminars for graduate students. With Jeffry Frieden and Kenneth Schultz, I have written an undergraduate textbook that avoids sectarian debates and focuses on substantive topics (Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2010). A volume I edited with Robert Powell, directed more at ﬁrst-year graduate students, explores this approach at a higher level (Lake and Powell 1999). Both are, I am gratiﬁed, well received, especially by younger scholars just starting their teaching careers. There is, I believe, a growing frustration with the dead hand of the isms and a quest for alternative ways of organizing intellectual inquiry. We can break free of the old order. A ﬁrst step in changing professional practice is to stop replicating that practice in our scholarly lives. In addition, **we should embrace partiality**. That is, we should acknowledge that all current theories are partial and state explicitly their boundary and scope conditions. Modesty in acknowledging such limitations is actually in the self-interest of scholars. A common but too easy criticism to make of another’s work is ‘‘yes, you may explain that’’ **but ‘‘you can’t explain this,’’ where ‘‘this’’ happens to be the critic’s area of specialized knowledge tha**t, in turn, **supports her favored research tradition**. With properly stated boundary and scope conditions, we would know whether the theory was intended to apply to ‘‘this’’ and whether the critic makes a valid observation. Through changes in editorial policy, authors should be required to include a short paragraph on the boundary conditions of their analysis and to state explicitly what their theory cannot explain. Even if editors do not require it, we as individual reviewers can insist on it. More important, the end—deeper knowledge—will hopefully justify the embrace of partiality. **We are all touching different parts of the proverbial elephant**, even while claiming to be holding it in its entirety. **By pooling our knowledge of the different parts, we might then be able to describe the whole animal more effectively**. **We might also then have something constructive to say to policymakers who want to control the elephant.** This is not, I want to make clear, a plea for atheoretic or necessarily policy relevant research, although the latter certainly has its place. We need theories to explain real-world patterns, not merely to describe them. And we need basic theory to reveal causes even when they are not amenable to manipulation by policymakers. But we should, as Sil and Katzenstein (2010) argue, embrace analytic eclecticism. A single scholar ought to be able to work on questions of war with theories of rational unitary states, questions of global environmental change with theories of individual norms, and questions of trade policy with theories of sectors pursuing their material interests without fear of **being criticized for inconsistency**.

**Objective reality exists and you should act to prevent the case impacts**

**Loewy 91** (Erich, associate professor of medicine at the University of Illinois and associate professor of humanities, “Suffering and the Beneficent Community: Beyond Libertarianism,” p. 17-21)

All of our judgments and decisions ultimately must be grounded in nonverifiable assumptions. The fundamentalist may deny this; but the fundamentalist grounds her judgments and decisions either in a religious belief based on revealed truth or, at least, on the assumption that “somewhere out there” truth exists and that we, in the human condition, can know it. Ultimately, or at least up to this point in time, absolute verification eludes man. At the extreme of this point of view, there are those who claim that truth is not only knowable, but is in fact, known and only the stubborn recalcitrance of the uninitiated prevents it from being generally accepted. This point of view claims not only that morality exists as a discoverable truth, an absolute not fashioned by men but unchanging and immutable, but also that truth has in fact been discovered. Rights and wrongs exist quite apart from the stage on which their application is played out. Situations may differ but, at most, such differences force us to reinterpret old and forever valid principles in a new light. Those who believe themselves to know the truth, furthermore, oftentimes feel compelled not only to persuade others to their point of view but feel morally justified in using considerable force to do so. On the other hand, some of us would deny the existence of immutable truth or, what is not quite the same thing, deny at least that it is knowable in the human condition. Those who flatly deny the existence of unalterable truth find themselves in much the same pickle as do those who flatly assert it: Both lack a standard of truth to which their affirmations can be appealed. Those who concede the possibility that truth exists but not the possibility that man in the human condition can be privy to it, have modified the position without greatly improving it. Their affirmation that man in the human condition can never know absolute truth seems more reasonable but is, once again, not verifiable. Who can know with certainty that tomorrow someone will not discover a way of “getting at” absolute truth and, in addition, be able to provide a simple and brilliant proof which other mortals to date have missed? Only an absolutist could deny such a possibility! That leaves us with a more pragmatic answer: Holding that, in the human condition, truth is not—or at least is not currently—accessible to us leaves more options open and does not fly in the face of the undeniable fact that, unlikely as it seems, our knowing absolute truth may be just around the corner. Outside the religious sphere, no one has ever convinced most thinking people that they are the possessors of absolute truth. Truth, whenever accepted at least for daily use, is invariably hedged. If we accept the fact that absolute truth (at least so far) is unknown to us and accept as an axiom that it may well be unknowable, we are left with a truth which for everyday use is fashioned rather than discovered. What is and what is not true or what is and what is not morally acceptable, therefore, varies with the culture in which we live. This claim (the claim on which, as we shall see, cultural relativism relies) rests on the assertion that there are many ways of looking at truths and that such truths are fashioned by people. Depending on our vantage point, there are many visions of reality,1a fact which the defenders of this doctrine hold to be valid in dealing with the concrete, scientific reality of chemistry and physics.2Such a claim, it would seem, is even more forceful when dealing with morals. As Engelhardt puts it so very well: “Our construals of reality exist within the embrace of cultural expectations.”3And our “construals of reality” include our vision of the moral life. Furthermore, not only do our “visions of reality occur within the embrace of cultural expectations,” the limits of what we as humans can and what we cannot culturally (or otherwise) expect are biologically framed by the totality of our bodies and their capacities as well as (and inseparable from the rest of the body of which it is a part) by our minds. **All human judgments and decisions**, then, **are inevitably grounded to prior assumptions which we accept and do not question for now**. There is a story about William James which illustrates the point. James was giving a lecture dealing with the universe at a Chattauqua: one of those events so popular at the turn of the century, which has, regrettably, been replaced by talk shows. At the end of his well-received lecture, a little old lady came up to him and said: “I enjoyed your talk, Mr. James, but you know you are making an error: The universe rests on the back of a tortoise!” “Very well,” James said, “I can accept that. But tell me, what in turn does that other tortoise rest upon?”  “It’s no use, Mr. James, it’s tortoises all the way down.” And so it goes: **Every assumption rests on the back of another assumption and if we are to examine all before proceeding with our everyday judgments and decisions we would get hopelessly mired** in mud. **The quest is necessarily endless. Ethical theories, like all other human activities, inevitably rest on prior assumptions**. Indeed, one cannot reason without a framework of reasoning, and similarly, one cannot reason about reasoning without such a prior framework. The question, it seems, is not the necessary acceptance of an assumption, for that is inevitable, but the depth and universality of the assumption taken. One needs steer between Scylla and Charybdis: on one side too-easy acceptance of a superficial assumption, on the other an endless and almost neurotic quest for ever more basic assumptions. Crashing on the other condemns one to eternal philosophical backpedaling, inactivity, and to leaving the original problem, whose immediate resolution may be critically needed, entirely unresolved. That some framework of reasoning is necessary was recognized by Kant when he claimed that, thanks to the “common structure of our mind,” thought processes inevitably divided the sensible world into categories which we then use to deal with it.4Rationality requires ways of dealing with the world and reasoning without categories is evidently not possible. The reason why there is no disagreement among persons about some logical propositions is that the common structure of our mind compels us to see certain things in certain ways and to reason along certain lines made inevitable by the very way in which our minds are structured. Even if, later on, we may discover that our universally agreed-upon proposition was wrong, we make this discovery using the same tools. We merely discover that some crucial fact was missing, some critical point not considered. The same basic method of reasoning and the same biological substrate for reasoning (the common structure of our mind) has been used to discover our error. I do not claim that our common biology and the common structure of our minds constitutes a way of discovering absolute truth. What such a common biology and such a common structure imply is that we inevitably will approach problems, see truth, and derive our judgments within such a bodily framework. **We are condemned** (or blessed) **to know the sensible world and to reason from the data presented to us and organized by us in certain and not in other ways. That does not reveal truth to us, but it presents us with a working model to be used, adapted, and learned from.** **The belief that there are no absolutes**(or that, at the very least, they are inaccessible to us in the human condition) **can lead to a moral nihilism in which no firm judgments can be made and no decisions or actions can be undertaken**. Such a moral nihilism claims that truths are fashioned by people and however a person may choose to fashion his truths serves no better than does any other way of constructing truths. The fashioning of truths, in that point of view,lacks its own frame of reference. It does not necessarily follow from this, however, that since our “construals of reality” occur purely within the “embrace of cultural expectations,” all visions of reality that are necessarily of equal worth, or that there are no generally useful standards that we can employ in judging either what we conceive to be physical or ethical reality. One can, for example, claim that some visions of reality are clearly and demonstrably wrong, and support such a claim by empirical observation or by showing that certain visions of reality simply do not work That is the stronger claim. In rejoinder, it can be said that empirical observations and “what works” are themselves part of the framework and that, therefore, such a claim lacks validity. On the other hand, one can make the somewhat weaker claim that certain visions, in the context of a given society and historical epoch, seem less valid than others because they confound careful observation or because they simply fail to work when applied to real situations occurring in real current societies.5This leaves room for a form of modified cultural relativism. Such a move does not deny that our “visions of reality occur within the embrace of cultural expectations.” But while such a move affirms that there are many realities of similar worth, it also suggests that within the context of such cultural expectations some realities have little, and others have much, validity. **Some realities work (have explanatory power translatable into action and are, therefore, usable) in the context of our experience and community, while some do not, and some work better than do others**. **Such a view neither throws up its hands and grants automatic equal worth nor rigidly enforces one view: It looks upon the problem as one of learning and growth in which realities (both empirical and ethical) are neither rigidly fixed nor entirely subject to ad hoc interpretation**. Ethical certitude, no more than certitude about anything else, is not possible in the human condition. The “ut in pluribus,” the generally and for the most part true of which St. Thomas Aquinas speaks, is the best we can hope for in science as well as in ethics. Since, however, we must inevitably act (nonaction being as much action as action itself), we must be prepared to act on less than complete certitude. Truth cannot, in a Cartesian sense, be expected to be apodictic; rather truth (whether it is scientific or moral truth) is to be worked with, shaped and developed as we experience, learn, and grow.

**Our epistemology isn’t flawed, doesn’t shape reality, and at worst middle ground is good**

WIGHT ‘7 (Colin, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield, “Inside the epistemological cave all bets are off” Journal of International Relations and Development (2007) http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/jird/jird\_200703\_v10n1\_d.pdf)

In some respects, this might seem to place me close to the position that Kratochwil suggests is absurd. For is not my position a form of ‘anything goes’? Well, again agreeing with Kratochwil that we should reject traditional logic and its associated yes or no answers, I will reply both yes and no.10 Yes, it is an ‘anything goes’ position insofar as I reject outright that we need to commit ourselves to any particular epistemological position in advance of making or judging particular knowledge claims. I can see no good reason for giving any specific epistemological standpoint a position of a priori privilege. But I can also answer no because this position does not mean that we are unable to make informed judgements on the basis of the evidence for the claim. The fact that philosophers have been unable to provide secure foundations for one or other epistemological stance does not alter the fact that we continue to use these positions to get along in the world. In this respect, I agree completely with Kratochwil’s claim (2007: 11) that both absolute certainty and absolute doubt are impossible positions to hold, and that we ‘go on’ in a situation located **somewhere in between**. It may be philosophically naı¨ve of me to claim that if I wish to know how many cars are parked in my drive, then the easiest way is to probably go and look. But I can do this without needing philosophy to prove empiricism infallible. Equally, in certain circumstances I might be able to ascertain how many cars are in my drive without looking; if, for example, I know that at time T1 that there were three cars and that one went away at time T2, then, if asked at time T3 (assuming these events are sequential), I have a legitimate case to say ‘two’. Of course, in either case, I could still be wrong but the point is that the claim about the existence of a certain number of cars can justifiably be supported on various epistemological grounds and we do not know in advance which will be the most appropriate. Hence the context in which the claim emerges is also an important aspect of its validity. In both cases, there is no doubt that observation or the process of rational deduction is theoretically laden, but to say that our concepts help carve up the world in certain ways is not to accept that they either determine the physicality of what exists or can, in all cases, stop an object from existing. 11 Again, in some respects, my position might appear to be quite close to Kratochwil’s pragmatist alternative. After all, pragmatists generally argue that we should do what works. There are certainly aspects of Kratochwil’s position that do suggest some affinities with my notion of epistemological opportunism. Thus, for example, he argues that ‘each science provides its own court and judges the appropriateness of its own methods and practices’(Kratochwil 2007: 12). This is, indeed, the position scientific realists adopt in relation to epistemological and methodological matters, although Kratochwil seems to reject that scientific realism out of hand. 12 But it is not clear why each science would need to judge the appropriateness of its own methods and practices unless there are some fundamental ontological differences that distinguish the object of study; which is exactly why scientific realists insist that ontology forms the starting point of all enquiry, not the a priori commitment to a set of scientific methods. According to the positivist view of science, there is a general set of rules, procedures and axioms which, when taken together, constitute the ‘scientific method’. Although the various strands of positivism disagree over the exact form of these axioms, the need to define them is common to all versions (Halfpenny 1982). For scientific realists, on the other hand, there can be no ‘scientific method’because differing phenomena will require differing modes of investigation and perhaps different models of explanation. This argument is embedded in the differing ontological domains that concern the individual sciences. Hence there can be no scientific method as such, since differing object domains will require methods appropriate to their study and a range of epistemological supports. Kratochwil’s position is very different. He accepts that we have to ‘search for viable criteria of assessment of our theories’(Kratochw il 2007: 1), but exactly which criteria does he suggest? First, he explicitly rejects the notion that the world itself will play any role, arguing that ‘if we recognize the constitutive nature of our concepts then we have to accept that we never ‘‘test’’ against the ‘‘real world’’ but only against other more or less-articulated theories’ (Kratochwil 2007: 3). The use of ‘never’ is a very strong statement and seems to rule out any role for empirical research.13 Of course, Kratochwil may argue that by ‘real world’ he does not mean the world of experience but some Platonic realm beyond experience. But, in so doing, he would be aligning himself with the positivists who also denied the possibility of accessing reality beyond that which can be experienced. Equally, of course, the empirical is part of the real world even if it does not exhaust it. Ultimately I think Kratochwil, like the positivists, does treat the world as the ‘world of experience’. This means that he has a very philosophically idealist notion of the real world, which also means that rather than transcending the materialist/idealist dichotomy, he is clearly on one side of it.14 There is, however, some confusion regarding this issue. For example, despite claiming that the objects of experience are the result of our constructions and interests, he also argues that no one really contests the claim that there is a common substratum to these objects (Kratochwil 2007: 6). Equally in previous work he has claimed that no one seriously doubts the existence of an independent world (Kratochwil 2000: 91). Given these claims, it seems that the point he is trying to make is the relatively uncontested idea that we describe the world in certain ways and that those descriptions play a role, perhaps even determine, in how we interact with the world. I know of no one who would object to this, but this is a long way from the claim that we construct objects in a physical sense, by describing them in particular ways, or that the world plays no role in terms of the assessment of our claims. To illustrate this issue he uses the example of a table, which he claims is something entirely different to a ‘physicist, the chemist, the cabinet maker, the user, or the art historian’(Kratochw il 2007: 6). Now, of course, how we use a table, or how we describe it is almost exclusively a matter of our discourses and interests. No one doubts this. Nor does anyone doubt that objects can be described in a number of differing ways. Yet the fact still remains that in order for any object to function as a table it needs to have a set of properties such that it can fulfil that role. Hence, we construct tables out of materials, such as wood, that have the properties of being able to support objects placed on them. No matter how creative we are within our community of rule-following scientists, we are not yet able to construct tables out of water.15 Thus, **the world itself simply cannot be discarded** in the manner Kratochwil suggests. **One can think of many such examples where the world does in a very real and important sense talk to us**: penalizing any attempt to put out fires using petrol rather than water for example; attempting to run our cars by packing them with environmental waste; or attempting to feed the starving of the world on fresh air as opposed to substances that provide nutritional value.16 If Kratochwil’s idealist metaphysics were correct, all of these should be possible as long as we have an interest in achieving them, and providing enough of a given community followed the rules governing this process. The nature of matter itself, however, seems to block this move, which, because we continuously interact with the material world, cannot be simply described, as Kratochwil does, as ‘irrelevant’(Kr atochwil 2007: 6). In a very meaningful and practical sense the world does communicate with us, accepting or rejecting our attempts to fashion it in ways to suit our interests on the basis of its specific modes of being (Pickering 1995). Likewise, when physicists or chemists interact with a table they generally do so in terms of it being a table, to place computers on, etc.17 Similarly, art historians also relate to tables as tables and only treat particular tables with additional properties as ‘art objects’. And it is not just any table that can function as a work of art, but only a table that does indeed possess certain properties that match it to the rules that determine what constitutes an ‘art object’. Without this, just about any table would do and the notion of forgery in art would be redundant. Of course, these issues are infinitely more complicated in the social world where existence is dependent upon language and concepts.18 Nonetheless, even in this realm existential claims made by theorists in academia are **not** a **necessary**, or sufficient, element **to bring social objects into being,** and **nor** do academic claims to the contrary **stop particular social objects from existing.** **Social objects existed long before institutionally located social scientists attempted to describe them**. Equally, in order to transcend the materialism/idealism dichotomy, we should be wary of embracing too sharp a distinction between natural and social processes. Accordingly, it is the case that human patterns of behaviour are impacting on global environmental processes in ways we have yet to fully understand and these processes will continue irrespective of whether we reach an intersubjective agreement on what they mean. And, of course, these same human-influenced processes will react back on social life in unforeseen ways, again often **irrespective of our descriptions of them**.19

# 1AR

## AT: Anthro

Inclusion of the anthropocentrism argument dooms the alternative

Lewis 92 – Professor of Environment

Martin Lewis professor in the School of the Environment and the Center for International Studies at Duke University. Green Delusions, 1992 p17-18

Nature for Nature’s Sake—And Humanity for Humanity’s It is widely accepted that environmental thinkers can be divided into two camps: those who favor the preservation of nature for nature’s sake, and those who wish only to maintain the environment as the necessary habitat of humankind (see Pepper 1989; O’Riordan 1989; W Fox 1990). In the first group stand the green radicals, while the second supposedly consists of environmental reformers, also labeled “shallow ecologists.” Radicals often pull no punches in assailing the members of the latter camp for their anthropocentrism, managerialism, and gutless accommo­dationism—to some, “shallow ecology” is “just a more efficient form of exploitation and oppression” (quoted in Nash 1989:202). While this dichotomy may accurately depict some of the major approaches of the past, it is remarkably unhelpful for devising the kind of framework required for a truly effective environmental movement. It incorrectly assumes that those who adopt an anti-anthropocentric view (that is, one that accords intrinsic worth to nonhuman beings) will also embrace the larger political programs of radical environmentalism. Sim­ilarly, it portrays those who favor reforms within the political and economic structures of representative democracies as thereby excluding all nonhumans from the realm of moral consideration. Yet no convincing reasons are ever provided to show why these beliefs should necessarily be aligned in such a manner. (For an instructive discussion of the pitfalls of the anthropocentric versus nonanthropocentric dichotomy, see Nor­ton 1987, chapter ir.)

**No impact, and rejecting anthropocentrist arguments and rhetoric cannot resolve anthropocentrism**

**Light 02**

[Light, Andrew, Assistant Professor of Environmental Philosophy and Director, Environmental Conservation Education Program, 2002 (Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters What Really Works David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willott, p. 556-57)]

In recent years a critique of this predominant trend in environmental ethics has emerged from within the pragmatist tradition in American philosophy.' The force of this critique is driven by the intuition that environmental philosophy cannot afford to be qui­escent about the public reception of ethical argu­ments over the value of nature. The original moti­vations of environmental philosophers for turning their philosophical insights to the environment sup­port such a position., Environmental philosophy evolved out of a concern about the state of the grow­ing environmental crisis, and a conviction that a philosophical contribution could be made to the res­olution of this crisis. But if environmental philoso­phers spend all of their time debating non­-human centered forms of value theory they will ar­guably never get very far in making such a contri­bution. For example, to continue to ignore human motivations for the act of valuing nature causes many in the field to overlook the fact that most people find it very difficult to extend moral consideration to plants and animals on the grounds that these entities possess some form of intrinsic, inherent, or other­wise conceived nonanthropocentric value. It is even more difficult for people to recognize that non­humans could have rights. Claims about the value of nature as such do not appear to resonate with the or­dinary moral intuitions of most people who, after all, spend most of their livesthinking of value, moral obligations, and rights in exclusively human terms. Indeed, while most environmental philosophers be­gin their work with the assumption that most people think of value in human-centered terms (a problem that has been decried since the very early days of the field), few have considered the problem of how a non-human-centered approach to valuing nature can ever appeal to such human intuitions. The particular version of the pragmatist critique of environmental ethics that I have endorsed recognizes that we need to rethink the utility of anthropocentric arguments in environmental moral and political theory, not nec­essarily because the traditional nonanthropocentric arguments in the field are false, but because they hamper attempts to contribute to the public discus­sion of environmental problems, in terms familiar to the public

## AT: FW

This educational model is vital to policy and academia– prevents insular education- this answers FIAT isn’t real

Jentleson ‘2 (Bruce W. Jentleson, Source: International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring, 2002), pp. 169-183, “Bringing Policy Relevance Back In”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092106>, Spring 2002, LEQ)

So, a Washington for- eign policy colleague asked, which of your models and theories should I turn to now? What do you academics have to say about September 11? You are sup- posed to be the scholars and students of international affairs-Why did it hap- pen? What should be done? Notwithstanding the surly tone, the questions are not unfair. They do not pertain just to political scientists and international relations scholars; they can be asked of others as well. It falls to each discipline to address these questions as they most pertain to its role. To be sure, political science and international relations have produced and continue to produce scholarly work that does bring important policy insights. Still it is hard to deny that contemporary political science and international relations as a discipline put limited value on policy relevance-too little, in my view, and the discipline suffers for it.1 The problem is not just the gap between theory and policy but its chasmlike widening in recent years and the limited valuation of efforts, in Alexander George's phrase, at "bridging the gap."2 The events of September 11 drive home the need to bring policy relevance back in to the discipline, to seek greater praxis between theory and practice. This is not to say that scholars should take up the agendas of think tanks, journalists, activists, or fast fax operations. The academy's agenda is and should be principally a more scholarly one. But theory can be valued without policy relevance being so undervalued. Dichotomization along the lines of "we" do theory and "they" do policy consigns international relations scholars almost exclusively to an intradisciplinary dialogue and purpose, with conver- sations and knowledge building that while highly intellectual are excessively insular and disconnected from the empirical realities that are the discipline's raison d'etre. This stunts the contributions that universities, one of society's most essential institutions, can make in dealing with the profound problems and challenges society faces. It also is counterproductive to the academy's own interests. Research and scholarship are bettered by pushing analysis and logic beyond just offering up a few paragraphs on implications for policy at the end of a forty-page article, as if a "ritualistic addendum."3 Teaching is enhanced when students' interest in "real world" issues is engaged in ways that reinforce the argument that theory really is relevant, and CNN is not enough. There also are gains to be made for the scholarly community's standing as perceived by those outside the aca- demic world, constituencies and colleagues whose opinions too often are self- servingly denigrated and defensively disregarded. It thus is both for the health of the discipline and to fulfill its broader societal responsibilities that greater praxis is to be pursued. September 11 Questions: Answers from the International Relations Literature? What knowledge is most needed to understand September 11 and the ques- tions posed about its causes, consequences, and the policy agenda it has set? And what answers do political scientists and especially international relations specialists have to offer? Four sets of questions need to be considered.